ABSTRACT Processes in operating systems are assigned different privileges to access different resources. A process may invoke other processes whose privileges are different; thus, its privileges are expanded (or escalated) due to such improper ''inheritance.'' Inter-networking can also occur between processes, either transitively or iteratively. This complicates the monitoring of inappropriate privilege assignment/escalation, which can result in information leakage. Such information leakage occurs due to privilege transitivity and inheritance and can be defined as a general access control problem for inter-networking linkages. This is also a topic that is generally less studied in existing access control models. Specifically, in this paper, we propose a lightweight directed graph-based model, LiCo, which is designed to facilitate the authorization of privileges among inter-networking processes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first general access control model for inter-invoking processes and general inter-networking linkages.
I. INTRODUCTION
Access control is crucial for modern day systems, as it prevents unauthorized access, for example to resources in operating systems and application layers. Conventional access control models focus on direct access control, in which an accessor can be granted access to certain objects (resources), based on the corresponding privileges. For example, access control is defined directly by a tuple a, o, p , where a is an accessor, o is an object, and p is a privilege. An accessor can also be assigned to a role (i.e. role-based access control), and in such model, the privileges are bind to the roles (e.g., faculty members, department heads, and deans) [2] . These schemes have been widely studied in the literature.
In indirect context, however, one accessor (e.g., A) may invoke another accessor (e.g., B). This can potentially result in an unauthorized extension of A's privileges. For example, A's privilege for o is p 1 , but A can invoke B to gain additional privilege for o to p 2 . Thus, we need a model to formalize how and when we can permit such additional privilege extension. In social networks (e.g., Tencent QQ space), for example, A shares a photo with her friends (e.g., B and C). The friends may leave some comments (information) relating to the shared photo. One of the friends (e.g., B) may access A's QQ space to gain other friends' information (e.g., C's information). How to regulate privilege abuse due to inter-invoking linkages among accessors is a topic that is under-explored in the existing literature.
Inter-invoking occurs when interactions among processes are frequent, for example for collaboration (e.g., a shopping application needs to cooperate with a transaction application for product payment on mobile devices). While these different processes have different privileges (e.g., the transaction application can access the users' payment account and location), security vulnerabilities may arise during the inter-invoking processes (e.g., by invoking a process that can directly access location information, a process may indirectly access the user's location information). In addition, current access control model for inter-invoking may regulate privileges by a switch -yes or no, which is not fine-grained.
It can be challenging to define an access control model for inter-networking linkages, as linkages can be either transitively or iteratively. There may also exist an invoking loop, and the inter-networking can be arbitrary linkage structures. There is also a need to design access control model that can be generalizable to different scenarios, such as social networks. This is the gap we seek to address in this paper. Specifically, we design a lightweight access control model (hereafter referred to as LiCo) to facilitate the authorization of fine-grained privileges among inter-invoking processes. The model is based on directed graph and comprises several key algorithms. LiCo is designed to efficiently detect privilege collisions, raise an alert, and properly authorize the right privileges.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections II and III survey related work and describe the research problem, respectively. Section IV describe our proposed model, whose security and performance are then evaluated in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In time-sharing system of 1970s, Jampson [3] proposed a DAC model for the data protection of multiuser computer system, mainly to set up the relationship table between the host and the guest(s). This model defines the level of security attributes on subject and object, to determine whether the subject has access to the object [4] . In August 2001, NIST [5] published the first RBAC standard, which includes two parts: RBAC reference model and RBAC functional specification. It realized the logic separation between users and permissions, simplifying authorization processes. There are a number of other models, such as the 1997 TBAC model of Thomas and Sandhu [6] , the domain based access control model DBAC of Shaifq et al. [7] , and the uniform access control framework of Covington et al. [8] . Petracca et al. [9] presented an access control model to handle privacy-sensitive permission on mobile devices. In the approach, the operation requests of applications were verified to determine if these requests are within the users' expectations explicitly.
In recent years, there have been attempts to use attributed-based encryption (ABE) in access control model. For example, Goyal et al. [10] developed a cryptosystem for fine-grained sharing of encrypted data, Key-Policy Attributed-Based Encryption (KP-ABE). Other research on ABE-based access control models include [11] , [12] (e.g., for cloud computing), [13] , [14] (e.g., web service), and so on. The popularity of HTML5-based mobile applications has also attracted the attention of access control researchers. In [15] , a fine-grained access control mechanism for HTML5-based applications in Android system was proposed.
In addiiton to RBAC access control models, there have been other access control models such as those based the access decisions on contexts [16] . For example, Bijon et al. [17] studied the differences between conventional constraint-based access control and risk-aware approaches in RBAC, from which a framework are built for risk-awareness in RBAC models incorporating quantified-risks.
Access control has applications in a broad range of settings, such as online social networks (OSNs) where user-specific information are being shared [18] . Carminati et al. [19] presented an access control mechanism for OSNs, based on semantic web. Specifically, the authors encoded social network information (e.g., user's profiles, relationships among users) using an ontology, based on which the access control model can be achieved and such mechanism can then be adapted for other OSN platforms by modifying the ontology. Ren et al. [20] also designed and implemented a lightweight tree-based model called SeGoAC, which supports self-defined privilege grant and revocation, as well as proxy-enabled and group-oriented access control for file storage in mobile cloud computing. 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Security breach is one of several consequences due to indirectly invoking of processes -see Fig. 1 . Although potentially malicious application cannot directly access certain resources such as location, camera, and microphone, such application can indirectly gain access to these resources by invoking another application that has been granted permission to these resources.
Note that the above threat model can be generalized. For example, some information accessed in one application (e.g., app A) may expand the accessible objects of another application (e.g., app B) who invokes this application (i.e., app A). This situation can occur not only during process invoking, but also in OSNs. For example, in Tecent QQ, if one (e.g., user A) makes his/her QQ space public to say users B and C, then users B and C may obtain additional information of another user, say user D by accessing user A's QQ space. Such leakage is always ignored by users and service providers, as it is challenging to objectively define the type of information that is being leaked.
Despite the challenge in not being able to objectively define leakage in such a situation, we argue that the leakage risk can be modeled as a privilege collision problem. Once the privileges of a subject (SA) for an object ''collides'' with the privileges of another subject (SB) with links to SA, we should regulate the privilege that are invoked (i.e., SA) VOLUME 6, 2018 or invokes (i.e., SB). Thus, to enhance one's understanding, we propose a graph model for access control that can visualize the inter-relation among accessors (e.g., processes) and the objects (resources, such as location, camera, and microphone) as follows: We can state ACG formally as follows:
The design of ACG is motivated by differentiating accessors and relations. An abstract model presented by a graph has the following advantages: it is general for diverse applications, it is easy to describe, and it is easy to understand. Moreover, some concepts in graph theory can be used to convey ideas, such as transitive closure, cyclic graph, and clusters. Graph algorithms are also be available as a basic tool. IV. PROPOSED SCHEME A. ACCESS CONTROL MODEL Fig. 2 presents a simple ACG, which comprises accessors (processes) that can access objects (resources) by both direct and indirect means. There are, however, situations where a processor may require indirect information from another process (e.g., a shopping application may request for location data) and the inter-networking process is one attack vector that may be exploited (e.g., Fig. 1 ). In our approach, the goal is to detect privilege collisions due to such indirect paths that may lead to the abuse of privileges (e.g., gain additional access privileges without permission), and to mitigate such collisions.
Specifically, ACG can be defined as follows: 1) ACG ::= V , E , where V is a set of vertexes and E is a set of edges. 2) V = V Acc ∪ V Obj , where V Acc is a set of accessors and V Obj is a set of objects.
3) E = E Inv ∪ E Acc , where E Inv is a set of invoking edges and E Acc is a set of accessing edges.
∀e ∈ E Inv , e = from, to where from ∈ V Acc , to ∈ V Acc . 8) Pri is a set of privileges. Pri ::= pri 1 , pri 2 , . . . , pri n , where |Pri| = n. E.g., Pri ::= read, write, update . 
The following function, denoted as HD, returns the hamming distance that can reveal whether collision occurs between two privileges.
Definition 5: Hamming distance function HD :
HD takes as input p 1 , p 2 ∈ {0, 1} n , and outputs n which is a Hamming Distance of p 1 and p 2 .
The following function (denoted as Cll a ) returns collisions between privileges for the same objects -privileges granted initially and privileges gained by transitively invoking.
Definition 6: Privilege collisions for closure function Cll a : a ∈ V Acc → n ∈ Z. Cll a takes as input an accessor a ∈ V Acc and outputs an integer number n = max({HD(p 1 , p 2 )|e 1 ∈ E 1 , e 2 ∈ E 2 , p 1 = e 1 .p, p 2 = e 2 .p, e 1 .to = e 2 .to}), where E 1 = {e 1 |e 1 ∈ E Acc , e 1 .from = a, e 1 .to ∈ Cls o (a), E 2 = {e 2 |e 2 .from ∈ Cls a (a), e 2 .to ∈ Cls ao (a)}).
We will now present the theorem relating to the detection of privilege breaches. Privilege collision is related to the definition of individual privilege and the relation among them. For example, if each privilege is independent, then collision will occur once there exist differences. If privilege is dependent (e.g., subset relation), then the collision will be more complicated. We will now define a simple function (denoted as Pri c ) on privilege collision, based on hamming distance.
Definition 7: Privilege collision function Pri c : We can map a privilege array consisting of 0, 1 (e.g., [1, 0, . . . , 1, 0]) to represent individual concrete privileges. We, thus, define a new process (denoted as A2PSet) to compute this mapping.
Definition 9: Array maps to privilege process A2PSet : p ∈ {0, 1} n → pri 1 , pri 2 , . . . , pri n ∈ Pri, n = |Pri|. A2P takes as input p ∈ {0, 1} n and outputs a set of privileges, in which Pri i is included if the i-th bit in array p is 1. Otherwise, Pri i is excluded from the set.
By using the above mapping process (i.e., A2PSet(·)), we can define a generalized collision detection function (denoted as A2C) that can handle different relation types between underlying individual privileges. It is described as follows:
Definition 10: Privilege collision by array function A2C : where E 1 = {e 1 |e 1 ∈ E Acc , e 1 .from = a, e 1 .to ∈ Cls o (a)}, and E 2 = {e 2 |e 2 .from ∈ Cls a (a), e 2 .to ∈ Cls ao (a)})}. If b = 0, then collision occurs; otherwise, there is no privilege collision.
We will now present a general conclusion. where E 1 = {e 1 |e 1 ∈ E Acc , e 1 .from = a, e 1 .to ∈ Cls o (a)}, E 2 = {e 2 |e 2 .from ∈ Cls a (a), e 2 .to ∈ Cls ao (a)})}, and IsLEQ We can simplify the conclusion to the following: Corollary 2: ∀a ∈ V Acc , if Cll a (a ∈ V Acc ) = 0 or Cls ao (a) ∩ Cls o (a) = ∅, then privacy breaches due to linkage.
Proof 3: Straightforward due to Theorem 1.
B. PROPOSED AUTHORIZING RULES
Next, we will propose relevant access control rules, based on the basic model described in the preceding section.
Proposition 1: Regulating Privileges of Invoked Processes from an Accessor (Rule I: Privilege is non-increasing for an invoking edge)
. Suppose e ∈ E Inv and invoking from accessor e.from. If e 1 .to = e 2 .to, where e 1 , e 2 ∈ E Acc , e.from = e 1 .from, e.to = e 2 .from, then let e 2 .p = e 1 .p. Otherwise, let e 2 .to =⊥.
In other words, the above rule states that if an accessor (e.g., process A) invokes another accessor (e.g., process B), then the privilege of invoked accessor (i.e., process B) must be less than or equal to the privilege of invoking accessor (i.e., process A) once the same object is accessed. The access control unit will normalize the privilege of invoked process B when B is invoked by A. That is, the above rule states that if an accessor (e.g., process A) invokes multiple accessors sequentially (e.g., processes B 1 , B 2 ,. . . ,B n ), then the privilege of invoked accessor (i.e., B i , i = 2, . . . , n) must be less than or equal to the privilege of invoking accessor (i.e., B i−1 ) once the same object is accessed. The access control unit will normalize the privilege of invoked process B i when B i is invoked by B i−1 In other words, the above rule states that if an accessor (e.g., process A) invokes multiple accessors sequentially (e.g., processes B 1 , B 2 ,. . . ,B n ), and forms a loop (i.e., B n invokes A, then the privilege of invoked accessor (i.e., B i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n) must be less than or equal to the privilege of invoking accessor (i.e., A) once the same object is accessed by all. The access control unit will normalize the privileges of all invoked processes B i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n to the least among them.
Proposition 4: Regulating Privileges of Invoking Processes from an Accessor (Rule IV: Privilege must be non-decreasing for invoking processes). Suppose ∃e ∈ E Inv . If e.to is invoked by e.from, and e 1 .to = e 2 .to, where e 1 , e 2 ∈ E Acc , e.from = e 1 .from, e.to = e 2 .from, then let e 1 .p = e 2 .p. If e 1 .to = e 2 .to, then e 1 .to =⊥.
In other words, the above rule states that if an accessor (e.g., process A) is invoked by an accessor (e.g., process B), then the privilege of invoking accessor (i.e., process B) must be larger than or equal to the privilege of invoked accessor (i.e., process A). The access control unit will normalize the privilege of process B to be larger than or equal to that of A.
Proposition 5: Regulating Privileges of Inter-network Invoking Process Closure from an Accessor (Rule V: Privilege for process closure is non-increasing). Suppose ∃e ∈ E Inv .
If ∃v ∈ Cls a (e.from), e 1 .to = e 2 .to, where e 1 , e 2 ∈ E Acc , e.from = e 1 .from, v = e 2 .from, then let e 2 .p = e 1 .p. If ∃v ∈ Cls a (e.from), e 2 .to = e 1 .to, where e 1 , e 2 ∈ E Acc , e.from = e 1 .from, v = e 2 .from, then e 2 .to =⊥ .
The above rule states that if an accessor (e.g., process A) invokes another accessor in its invoking closure set (e.g., process B), then the privilege of invoked accessor (i.e., process B) must be less or equal to the privilege of invoking accessor (i.e., process A). Access control unit will normalize the privilege of process B to be less than or equal to that of process A.
Proposition 6: Regulating Privileges Container (Rule VI: Privilege container). Given any v ∈ V Inv , if ∃e 1 ∈∈ E Inv , e 2 , e 3 ∈ E Acc such that e 1 .from = f , e 1 .to = t, e 2 .from = f , e 2 .to = o, e 3 .from = t, e 3 .to = o, then let e 3 .p ⇐ e 2 .p or e 3 .p ≤ e 2 .p.
The above rule is iterative for any inter-networking processes, which becomes a container for regulating the maximum privilege for any invoking processes.
C. PROPOSED ALGORITHMS
We will now present our algorithms to achieve the above directed graph based access control model. Although our model can formally specify the rationale in access control mechanisms, these proposed algorithms can facilitate the understanding of programmers in their implementations.
Algorithm 1 returns all invoking accessors given any accessor in ACG. It can be considered the instantiation of Cls a (·). Using this function, all invoked accessors, directly or indirectly, can be returned and further examined. Algorithm 2 is a recursive algorithm that can obtain all accessible objects, directly and indirectly. It can be considered an instantiation of Cls ao (·). In this algorithm, e.to denotes the objects that e.from can access with corresponding privileges e.pri. v.visit ∈ {0, 1}, visit is a label to denote whether a vertex has been visited. Algorithm 4 can regulate privileges for a given access control graph. In other words, it can be implemented as an access control module to regulate concrete accessing policies and avoid privilege breaches.
Examples. Example I: Process A invokes another process (e.g., process B) in order to access object o. The control unit will detect privilege collisions and decide whether process A can expand its privileges to that of process B or process A has to limit the privileges to its own. Example I can take place in operating system, web services, application programming interface, dynamic link library, developing frameworks, remote process calling, and so on.
Example II: Process A is invoked by another process (e.g., B) in order to access object o. Process A will consult the control unit to check the original privileges of process B for o and then process A is limited to these privileges.
The distinction between Examples I and II is in the control domain of the control unit, that is, the former is at invoking whilst the latter is at the invoked process.
Example III (A General Case): In OSN applications (e.g., Facebook or QQ), if one user (e.g., user A) shares some information such as a photo or video with others, these other users may comment on the shared material. User A can access such user-generated comments, say of users B and C. However, in some context, we need to determine whether user B can access the comments from user C and vice versa, as the comments may reveal information about the comment originator.
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will evaluate the security of Lico. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a lightweight graph-based model for access control among inter-networking processes. Our design is motivated by the observation that privilege misuses can occur due to inter-invoking among processes. The proposed model is designed to be generalizable and can be applied for access control in inter-networking linkages. This extends conventional access control models such as RBAC. The proposed graph-based model is also lightweight, and the cost is only O(n), where n is the number of accessor vertexes in the access control graph.
Future research includes a more comprehensive evaluation of its security and performance in a real-world implementation. 
